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Deleuze, art and social work 
Abstract 
This article outlines the value of Deleuze’s philosophy to social work in offering a different 
understanding of the constitution of reality and being human and the importance of the visual by 
way of artistic and craft activities. The key concepts derived from Deleuze’s work and outlined in the 
article concern the idea of the ‘virtual’ as relevant to the concept of ‘a life’ and ‘difference and 
repetition’ as a way of conceptualising an anti-essentialist post-modern view of identity as 
fragmented, but dynamic.  In other words partaking of chaotic, but also creative potential.  This 
conceptualisation of life allows to think about all lives, even ‘difficult’ ones, as potentially creatively 
undetermined in the future, rather than just pathologically predetermined by the past. Arts and 
crafts are seen as having the power to provoke and soothe, allowing a process of discovery of what 
the material and the person might both become in the doing.  Thus the article offers an ontological 
grounding validating not just arts and crafts, experiential learning and apprenticeship models as 
essential to social work practice and training at a time when these might be driven out by evidence 
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Introduction 
The argument put forward in this article is that Deleuze’s philosophy offers a way of understanding 
how visual imagination as part of art and craft activities opens possibilities for re-framing one’s 
experiences and working with problems. In order to validate and explicate this claim it  introduces 
some of Deleuze’s key ideas to offer a particular ontological and epistemological grounding for the 
importance of visual arts and crafts in the practice of social work. This is important in the light of 
evidence-based and scientific/positivistic models having restricted what is valued and given time, in 
a period of unprecedented cuts to social care budgets. 
 
For those unfamiliar with the terms ontology and epistemology, ontology refers to the ‘nature of 
being’, or to put it another way what we believe the nature of reality to be, while epistemology 
concerns the study and practices that might arise from what we believe that nature of being and 
reality to be.  Deleuze’s philosophical framework offers a very different, often very abstract way of 
thinking about the nature of being and of reality, more concerned with understanding change and  
process, than with outcomes.  Simply put, process is about how one lives in the world, how one is 
affected by one’s context and surroundings and how one affects them, in other words it is about the 
more fluid aspects of life, mostly happening below the level of consciousness.   
 
While there is literature about the value of arts and crafts in the field of Social Work (see most 
recently in this journal Trevelyan et al., 2014; Tudor et al., 2015; Moxley and Feen, 2015), my aim 
here is to outline what the philosophy of Deleuze offers to an understanding of why  arts and crafts 
need to be valued in both the practice and the training of social workers.   It is noted by many 
authors (Bell, 2012, gives an excellent overview) that ontological issues have been relatively 
neglected and that this gap creates inconsistency between ontological foundations, epistemology, 
ethical aims of the profession and mainstream practice.  This article therefore aims to make a small 
contribution to this needed development of ‘post-conventional’ (Bell, 2012) ontological and 
theoretical grounding in the field.   
To do this the article starts with a Deleuzian view on the nature of being human, which is then 
followed by a reflexive narrative to explicate, ground and exemplify what follows from such 
ontological tenets. As often those entrusted to the social care profession are those suffering what 
Goffman (2009) would term ‘spoiled identity’, identity, seen as dynamic and embodied, open to 
contradictions and disorder (Deleuze 2004; 2005; Deleuze and Guattari, 1999), is the starting point.  
This allows the introduction of how difference and repetition are conceptualised as key to it in 
Deleuze’s (2004) work.  These concepts are also later related to artistic practices and are embedded 
in a wider understanding of life as composed of a duality.  This duality is not one of nature and 
culture or mind and body, rather Deleuze (following Bergson) proposes that alongside what is 
actualised in our embodied, historical existence another realm is continuously present, while being 
out of sight. The term used to denote this less visible, beneath the surface, but real domain is the 
‘virtual’ (not to be confused with virtual as in virtual reality).  This formulation acknowledges mostly 
unseen forces and tensions in our lives that lead to actual events, but by doing so restrict the 
potential, that all of us have, to respond to them creatively.  The argument being developed is that 
arts and crafts give access to that realm and its potential, by freeing up imagination, while giving 
expression to the tensions and conflicts underlying actual problems, creating the opportunity to 
change our relation to them and move forward in a new way.   Arts and craft activities have the 
capacity to provoke and soothe, to open up a process of discovery of what the material and the 
person might both become in the doing.    
  
This framework offers an alternative perspective to the dominant neo-liberal, evidence based and 
medicalised discourses. While the value of art is not a new idea, a positivist and reductive paradigm 
allied to neo-liberal policies has meant that this aspect of practice, when and if it happens, is most 
often unsupported by institutional structures (Moxley and Feen, 2015).   
 Identity, difference and repetition and a bit of contextual framing in relation to social work 
The word identity gives us a clue to what is normally regarded as key to it, namely being ‘idem’-Latin 
for same- over time.  In Deleuze’s and much post-modern theory no such thing is possible in a literal 
sense and most of us can acknowledge in a common sense way that who I am now cannot be quite 
the same as who I was many years ago, yet most of us have a sense of continuity under normal 
circumstances.  Our bodies give an example of that: they are continually changing, cell renewal 
means that in reality our bodies are never the same. The paradox is that in spite of this, we are 
recognisable to ourselves and others, unless some majorly traumatic event occurs or we choose to 
change our appearance in major ways.  Difference and repetition, as Deleuze (2004) points out, are 
not oppositional binaries, but relationally implicated with each other: for things to stay the same, 
continuous renewal is required.  Our bodies as well as our identity over time rely on this relation 
between difference and repetition for the experience of continuity.  In Deleuze’s (2004) view, 
repetition always involves difference, it is never repetition of the same.  What we repeat is the 
overall pattern of relations that make us who we are, while the elements that are in relation are 
always in flux.  Art follows the same process: we use different materials to express our perceptions 
and experiences.  The artistic production is not the object, just as the map is not the territory, but a 
different re-presentation (used in the sense of presenting anew) of our encounter with it through a 
different medium.  This I hope will become clearer as I expand on the theoretical frame with 
examples in the following sections of the article.   
While the continuous process of change, both inner and outer, ensures our survival, it is the aspect 
we are least aware of.  It is the one we tend to take for granted, prizing the sameness that it is 
seemingly in service to.  There is a hierarchical ordering here and an oppositional stance.  The 
sameness (you don’t look a day older!) is seen as an aspect of health, while pathologising has its field 
day in its disruptions, making use of the relative ubiquity of some aspects of change and 
development by normalising them, while highlighting others as anomalies to be got rid of, more 
often than understood.  This is where people with dementia, intellectual disabilities and/or 
traumatised and/or disordered lives show us aspects of being human with a problematic social and 
policy history.  We have moved away from the more severe manifestations of not wanting to see 
them or be reminded of them, by no longer locking people up in segregated institutions.   Yet having 
attempted to rectify the situation through care in the community   and other policies, other new and 
different problems have taken the place of old ones.  In extreme cases the learning disabled or 
mentally unwell requiring acute intervention are often wrongfully placed  in secure institutions or 
prisons that have replaced the old institutions (segregated residential/ asylums). Dealing with less 
extreme difference, on the other hand, relies on over-optimistic faith in the capacities of individuals, 
families and (fast disintegrating) communities to care in an often culturally and materially 
impoverished environment.  Thus social and other care work these days is not only having to be 
outcome and bio-medically driven, but fragmented and often reduced to the provision of statutory 
duties. Bell (2012) and others argue that the inconsistency between social work’s modernist 
ontological foundations and many of social work’s epistemological concepts, such as anti -oppressive 
and critical approaches, represents a major contradiction in the conceptualisation of the profession’s 
philosophical base. New approaches are needed.   
Adopting a Deleuzian view, identity is about a dynamic relation between difference and sameness, 
open to change and ‘becoming’ and encompassing disordered states of mind as part of everyone’s 
make-up.  These are seen as potentially creative, rather than just dysfunctional.  This allows it to 
chime with the ethical concerns of social justice, notions of equality and non-discriminatory 
practices that have animated the profession.  Art and craft allow for that creativity to be accessed.  I 
have mentioned a particular kind of duality at the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy.  This is expressed in 
synthesis in Deleuze’s last essay A Life (2005).  
 ‘A life’   
The Deleuzian concept of ‘a life’ can be understood as equivalent to the ‘virtual’ in relation to an 
individual.  ‘A life’ is unique, ‘impersonal and yet singular’ (Deleuze, 2005: 8-9).  It does not require a 
conscious process of individualisation and can never be completely specified.  It is something that 
underlies ‘the life’ of the individual, it is the hidden, though real realm of forces and tensions that 
give rise to ‘their’ life.  It is ‘pure immanence’, that is something underlying, deeply implicated in all 
of reality (Williams in Parr, 2005: 125-127), generative of, yet not superior too, actual conditions of 
existence.  It is something we might be able to connect to more closely in significant moments of 
intensity.  
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are 
measured by given living objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events and singularities 
that are merely actualized in subjects and objects. […] The singu larities and the events that 
constitute a life coexist with the accidents of the life that corresponds to it, but they are neither 
grouped nor divided in the same way. (Deleuze, 2005: 29-30) 
His essay Immanence: A Life from which the above quote is derived is his last piece of writing, some 
would call it a sort of testament (Deleuze, 2005: 20); short and hard to decipher without prior 
exposure to his work, it gives us a final synthesis of what his work tries to open up for us: a different 
way of thinking about the world, that encompasses both the material and actual world we live in and 
its real, but not actualised, generative conditions.  Let me give you an example: a complex 
combination of push/pull factors is usually involved in migration, these factors range from 
environmental, personal as well as political.  When the tensions of existence in one’s place of origin 
or residence become too intense, the result is migration.  That is the actual event, but those tensions 
have generated it and only some aspects may be readily identified.  Others remain beneath the 
surface unknown to the migrant like me (I was born and grew up in Italy) : I only became fully aware 
of a trajectory initiated three generations back through an ethnographic journey back to my Italian 
roots.  The conditions for my coming to England were far more complex than I had known till then.   
My life is here in England, ‘a life’ includes all the influences I absorbed in Italy and still link me to that 
place.  The general realm of these conditions is what is meant by the ‘virtual’: a transcendental 
realm of interconnections, tensions and relations of forces, encompassing all of existence: it is where 
the potentiality of the world resides, its variety and indeterminacy, which is continuously 
transformed into our actual living.  As such it encompasses the natural and environmental forces 
that underlie the world we live in, as well as the unconscious processes of the human mind.   
 ‘A life’, rather than ‘the life of’ or ‘my life’ or ‘my identity’ indicates both a generality and a 
specificity, which is not about possession, as in ‘my life’, or judgement (Deleuze, 2005). We cannot 
refrain from judgement about having a good or a bad life, we are so used to it. Our judgements are 
often superficial and based on repertoires of categories, which those less familiar with them would 
neither necessarily agree with nor recognise themselves within.  The idea of ‘poverty’, for example, 
is not something non-modern societies would recognise about themselves, it is an etic concept, i.e. a 
concept belonging to outsiders to that context. Take the idea of victimhood and dependency.  Why 
does benefit fraud so enrage public opinion? Of course there is more than one answer (see  author’s 
own, 2012 for a different one), but given its very low incidence (0.9%) and low impact in the grand 
scheme of things, what may be one of its most effective powers to offend is that it puts two fingers 
up to the idea of the dispossessed as poor victims.  It turns the tables on the accustomed, ‘pro per’ 
order of things; it transgresses the emotional economy of power.  Choosing a life on the streets is 
something few ‘housed minds’ can appreciate as a choice . It is rather conceived as a matter of 
personal irresponsibility, rather than a reasonable response to conditions that make it the best one 
might be able to aspire to at a particular time or on a more permanent basis (see Scanlon and 
Adlam, 2006).  The possibility that such choice may be actually about a life that has kept closer to 
chaos and indeterminacy in a positive way and learned to live with problems as best it can, does not 
often get taken seriously.  Yet this is what Deleuze would advocate: the art and craft of living with 
problems, rather than the resolution or elimination of them. This does not of course mean we 
should just stop thinking about the conditions that have made that the best option for some, though 
it takes us away from stigmatising and thinking of such situations in a reductive and individualised 
way.   
It also offers hope, something much needed in any work that involves exposure to people in distress 
and in need of care.  It offers a positive view: ‘a life’ is always in the making (ibid: 13-14).  This is true 
for all of us and all of us partake of moments or events that lead us to disordered states, what 
Deleuze would term ‘pre-subjective delirium’ and ‘pre-individual singularity’.  These terms are used 
to denote a zone or plane of indeterminacy in any person’s make up.  These terms are suggestive of 
the chaotic, the personality disordered, the discontinuous or irrational.  This is often what 
disenfranchised, autistic, mentally unstable persons and, according to Deleuze, children show us: 
they are singular, we could not confuse them with someone else, yet they are not necessarily 
coherent and self-aware. Often they are more capable of intensity and passion, than supposedly 
better adjusted, more ordered characters.   Could this be an indication of a closer relation to ‘a life’, 
to the ‘virtual’, rather than ‘my life’? 
The idea of ‘a life’ is about immanence, process, virtuality (Deleuze, 2005: 28-31) and in turn these 
are to do with potentiality, to a being open to becomings and transformations (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1999). The idea of care and social work are transformed by this perspective from an 
elimination of, or dealing with, problems to a relational stance that is about how to live with  (and 
help others to live with) problems in as creative a way as possible.  Art has a place in this.  As 
Rajchman puts it: “Deleuze came to think that artworks just are sensations connected in materials...  
Through affect and percept artworks hit upon something singular yet impersonal in our bodies and 
brains, irreducible to any pre-existent ‘we’ (Deleuze 2005: 9-10)”. In this case the pre-existent ‘we’ 
should be understood as referring to an essentialist notion of identity, which Deleuze does not 
subscribe to.  Art is not primarily about thought or judgement, but sensation based experience.  
   
Lives, affect, art and the potential for the new 
Virtuality as the indeterminate (yet determining) (back)ground of reality has a correlate in the notion 
of affect.  Deleuze and Guattari (1999, p. xvi) see affect as ‘a prepersonal  intensity corresponding to 
the passage from one experiential state of the body to another’ .  As such that passage is marked by 
sensation, yet the sensation is not determined a priori, but is open to qualification (Massumi, 2002).  
Qualification is the process by which we interpret some experience as pleasant or unpleasant or 
anything more subtly in between, and this interpretation is dependent on/is in relation to a host of 
other experiences that may be part of our individual present and past actual life.  That actual life 
however does partake of the potential of the new, by being also always connected to the pre -
personal and virtual plane.  This means all lives, even ‘difficult’ ones are potentially creatively 
undetermined in the future, rather than just pathologically predetermined by the past. This shifts 
the focus and gives a priority to affective encounters and to affective conditions that include 
environmental aspects.  
This links to a different understanding of health and freedom, as Duff (2014: 19) notes in Deleuzian 
terms: “health is advanced or promoted in the provision of new affective sensitivities and new 
relational capacities”. 
Health may, indeed, be characterised in more Deleuzian terms as a differential process of 
becoming reasonable, strong and free, where freedom is understood not in some totalising way 
synonymous with a prevailing moral order, but rather as a specific moment of rupture or 
transformation in which something new emerges in an active expression of creativity and 
invention (ibid: 17). 
 The role of creative practices such as art and craft activities is that they might afford the opportunity 
to re-configure our affective connections and qualifications. They allow the foregrounding of some 
aspects of one’s experience, while putting others in the background, affecting therefore perception 
and its qualifications, with all the ramifications that might activate. This relation and interplay 
between foregrounding and backgrounding is what is also involved in art (Deleuze, 2004: 31).  
In Deleuzian terms ‘the arts produce and generate intensity, that which directly impacts the nervous 
system and intensifies sensation’ (Grosz, 2008: 3).  This is what in my view gives them the power to 
reshape processes of engagement with the world.  The arts in this conceptualisation are not about 
the production of concepts, rather they produce affects and intensities able to address problems 
and provocations (ibid: 1). While conceptualising is not their aim, they may give rise to different 
affects and intensities that may align or link to different ways of thinking about problems. While 
artistic practices are not aimed at solving problems, they may give rise to ways of living with them in 
terms of changing one’s relation to them.  
Art, experience, expertise and apprenticeship 
In Deleuze’s philosophy process is key.  Process, in very simplistic terms,  is about how something 
happens; how one lives in the world, how one is affected by one’s context and surroundings and 
how one affects them, in other words it is about movements, speeds, relationality, mostly 
happening below the level of consciousness. Deleuze and Guattari (1999) talk about a molecular 
level of becoming and transformation, happening at a subtle and mostly unconscious level: “… 
‘learning’ always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a 
profound complicity between nature and mind” (Deleuze, 2004: 205).  Affective expressions- a smile, 
a gesture, a greeting, a way of holding-may be more important than what we know, say or do. While 
knowledge is needed, it is not sufficient in itself: expertise needs an experiential and relational 
dimension, which is of enormous therapeutic value. The word ‘expertise’ shares an etymological 
root with experience and experiential, after all, and what is meant by experience is not about what is 
known in academic terms, but what is learnt from practice.  Some things cannot easily be learnt 
from books, but need to be learnt by doing.  This is where the notion of apprenticeship is important. 
For instance, it is one thing to know about challenging behaviour in theory, another to encounter it, 
be affected by it and learn to regulate our own affective response, the fear, frustration, anger or 
confusion and learn from it.  The external challenge and our own response marks a profound 
encounter that involves both parties in an intense relationship with external and internal 
experiences. It can bring deep learning not just about the other, but also ourselves, if deeply 
engaged with in both directions.  Emphasising this aspect in social work, education and care training 
more generally and not just in relation to this more extreme example would in my view be extremely 
useful, as would the provision of practice supervision.    
To return to Deleuze’s philosophy and art - Anne Sauvagnargues (2013) argues that he has created a 
semiotic of creativity, based on an experiential rather than phenomenological approach (Aroles and 
McLean, 2016) and most of his work deals with art of all kinds (Sauvagnargues, 2013; Grosz, 2008).  
Arts and crafts involve a relation with materials, they rely on the senses, yet connect also to what is 
beyond the senses.  To illustrate the relation of body, materials and the forces and relations beyond 
the senses, Deleuze (2004: 204-5) gives the example of how to think of the sea (drawing from 
Leibniz) and learning to swim.  The difficulty of the passage that follows may show how much easier 
it is to learn to swim that to theorise it and may also illustrate the challenge I have in trying to 
communicate what is a dense, but extremely useful set of ideas.  Deleuze speaks of the sea and the 
‘idea’ of the sea as a system of differential relations, the totality of which is expressed in the real 
movement of the waves, and learning to swim as the conjugation “of the distinctive points of our 
bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field.  This 
conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real acts are adjusted to 
our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a solution to the problem” (ibid: 204-5).  
While not everyone can swim, it is harder to explain in words and to unpack theoretically, than it is 
to learn from practice.  For a very humorous rendition of the limitations of an intellectual only 
approach to learning I recommend reading Alexander McCall-Smith’s (2004) The Two and a Half 
Pillars of Wisdom, where academics attempt to learn to play tennis and to swim from a book, with 
hilarious and ultimately tragic results.   
The experiential aspect is key to Deleuze’s notion of apprenticeship of living with problems (Deleuze, 
2004: 204-205).  In the past much vocational training was delivered through apprenticeships: in the 
UK this only dwindled around 1900 (Lane, 1996) and there is a current move towards re-establishing 
them as part of Higher Education programmes (Skills Funding Agency 2015) .  Medieval apprentices 
would live with and learn their trade from a master craftsman, apprenticeships could last from seven 
to 14 years.  Most Medieval and Renaissance painters had their schools and apprentices often 
painted large parts of a canvas; Medieval Craft Guilds passed on their expertise this way.  This is 
because organising the materials, learning to use them and creating some expression is a complex 
process best learnt through a physical engagement and the role modelling of someone who has 
mastered the encounter with the materials.  That encounter sets us against not only the resistance 
of the materials themselves, what they can and will do and what they will not, and connects us to 
our own bodies, but also confronts us with our limitations, resistance and preconceptions.  I have 
experienced first-hand the power of such activities to provoke and soothe.  I do not consider myself 
an artist, but I dabble, I use art and crafts as therapeutic tools for myself and have even taught art 
for a period of my life.  I was fortunate to have an artistic mother and grandparents skilled in 
different crafts, all practical people able to make things.  I learnt to embroider when very young; I 
can crochet, knit, sew and have the basics of spinning and weaving.    I started to crochet again 
recently to relieve stress and found myself having the sense that what I was actually doing was 
transferring the tension and twistedness of my nervous system into the twists of the crochet: as I 
hooked, turned and twisted the yarn, I felt my tension flow out of me and transform into a piece of 
usable material; my stress became productive and dissolved, at least for a while.  Adult colouring 
books have become popular and advocated by mindfulness practitioners as a way to ‘distract’ 
service users away from stress or distress, but another way of thinking about this is to see their 
potential as bringing repetition to bear on difference, in other words bringing order to chaos (I 
understand this to be the value of my Sudoku playing habit before going to sleep and possibly the 
source of its popularity).  On the other hand I have also tried to paint the skies I have so enjoyed 
observing after a recent house move and have been totally infuriated by my incapacity and lack of 
skill.  To put it in Deleuzian terms, I cannot (yet) conjugate the ‘Idea’ of the clouds, the interplay of 
light, air and water, with my handling of the paint medium.  I could use a period of apprenticeship to 
learn this. 
Having said this, one must add that knowing how to use the materials is part of the discovery and 
making a painting one is satisfied with is also part of the pleasure.  What is involved is a disciplined 
experiential approach of learning what you can do with what and how to do it, which can sometimes 
result in more than one expected.  As Grosz (2008: 4) puts it: “Art enables matter to become 
expressive, to not just satisfy, but also to intensify - to resonate and become more than itself.” To 
return briefly to ‘difference and repetition’, one of the ways we can see art’s endeavour is as the 
expression of the differential relations of whatever we wish to present anew (rather than represent) 
by using different materials.  It is about a visual imagination (re)producing those relations through 
materials other than those of the original event or natural manifestation, involving difference for the 
(re)creation of the same.   
 
I know several people for whom art is a profoundly terrifying activity, it can feel humiliating and 
shaming.  Mostly this has to do with dashed expectations of control and mastery, preconceived ideas 
and ambitions, bad school experiences and the sense of regression that adults can experience in 
trying to do something held in high social status and commercially valued on the one hand 
(museums and art galleries being high culture) and childish play on the other.   This is a particularly 
big problem when we try to create art.  The crafts are less problematic by being given a lower social 
status to art, by being less idealised and more practically oriented towards producing useful items.  
Yet both arts and crafts partake of an encounter with what Benjamin (2004) might term the 
lawfulness of materials, meaning what can and cannot be done with them, and both involve the 
organising and practice of processes, both technical and in excess of what is needed for pure 
survival. Choosing one’s tools needs to relate to both task and material.  Going against the grain of 
the wood will not produce enjoyment or a good result.   The making of a knitted jumper is never just 
about warmth, but also includes design and creativity of some kind.  Chairs come in all sorts of 
different designs, shapes and details telling us so much about those who made them, when and for 
what purpose as well as telling us about those whose chairs they might be or become .  Marx made it 
the key to his idea of what makes us different from animals, though a Deleuzian view would contest 
this as a unique human capacity (see Grosz, 2008).   
The provocativeness of arts and crafts, the challenges they pose to us through the particular 
qualities of different materials, is aggravated by our tendency to focus on outcomes, rather than on 
a process of discovery of what the material and the person might both become in the doing. My 
experience of teaching painting to learning disabled young people was that there was relatively little 
resistance, the ‘self’ was getting less in the way of the activity.  This I believe to be a useful initial 
approach for people at any stage of life: to approach art as play and experimentation and offer it as 
such to begin with.  This is not to be understood again in a hierarchically structured and judgemental 
way that might see it as an invitation to regression, itself a term charged with negative connotations.  
Rather it should be seen as a move to the source and foundation of our social and cultural  life as 
Winnicott pointed out (1971) and in Deleuzian terms as a ‘becoming-child’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1999).  This is the process of finding the receptivity, youthfulness and vitality of each stage of life, 
not at all a regressive notion.  Rather it is a notion deeply linked to development at all ages, 
congruent with the earlier statement that “health is advanced or promoted in the provision of new 
affective sensitivities and new relational capacities”.  The links made  between a dynamic notion of 
identity, open to transformation in the future and the role of art in offering the possibility for such 
transformation, re-framing and re-imagining one’s life, offer a different ontological base to the 
modernist prevailing views which entails a refocusing on process and affective encounters in 
promoting health.     
 
Conclusion 
A Deleuzian approach to care and social work means a promotion of non-pathologising, non-
judgemental attitudes and an emphasis on affective dimensions of practice, including art and craft 
activities, rather than outcome oriented practices.  While this may already be part of what social 
workers do and art may have been far more important to practice in the past (England, 1986), the 
focus on performance and outcomes prevalent in neo liberal management practices may be 
relegating this to the common sense and ethical orientation of individual practitioners .  This should 
instead be regarded as a keystone of training and practice with ontological and epistemological 
foundations able to fully promote the importance of artistic and craft practices as part of what might 
offer opportunities for creative transformation (Parr, 2005: 57-59), something that for Deleuze and 
Guattari (1999) is both experiential and social (Parr, 2005: 59). The fact that this way of thinking 
includes environmental, social and psychological aspects in a complex inter-relation allows us to 
think in terms of enabling environments that will also include physical settings and arrangements, 
social interactions and other aspects key to affective impact.    
However my focus for present purposes has been on it offering the foundation for a non-
judgemental relationality based on a particular understanding of our common humanity in that all of 
us may experience times of ‘pre-personal subjectivity’, disorientation, contradictions and less than 
well integrated identities in both personal and professional lives.  We all share this aspect of the 
human condition, if we accept this framework it is an ontological ground.  Whether we can 
withstand that experience and are able to use it creatively is what matters.  This does not mean we 
do not need knowledge and professional expertise, but that relationality, affective encounters really 
matter and have to be part of that expertise.  It gives us a better place to start from in relating to 
others, a place that may acknowledge differences and give us a way of acknowledging and relating 
to aspects of humanity we have in common that may be less than coherent or seemingly irrational.  
It might make us less afraid of our own vulnerabilities, which in turn might allow us to be more open 
to learning, which involves experience (and mistakes).  It may foster compassion, not in a 
condescending gesture towards the less fortunate, but in terms of its etymological roots: to suffer 
with, to share in a human condition, rather than feel somehow above it and professionally detached, 
while acknowledging the strain this might put on us and how sometimes we can’t but defend 
ourselves by detaching or be in danger of becoming too identified.   
Thinking this way means that by being always connected to the pre-personal, to ‘a life’, actual life 
also always partakes of the potential of the new.  This opens us to seeing even ‘difficult’ lives as 
potentially creatively undetermined in the future, rather than just pathologically predetermined by 
the past. Art in this conceptualisation produces affects and intensities able to connect to ‘a life’, to 
that indeterminate aspect of our existence (Grosz, 2008: 1).  How we relate to the intensity and 
affective singularities of others matters.  Art and craft can produce encounters with that intensity, 
may enable both parties to work with resistances, contradictions and elicit communication, by giving 
indirect ways of expressing that which is hard to talk about.   
To conclude: the potential of creative practices is to give expression to problems and provocations 
and potentially help to re-configure our affective connections, foregrounding some aspects of 
experience, while putting others in the background.  This means that how we relate to those 
experiences, how good or bad or how important we might judge them to be may change . That 
change may in turn give us new possibilities.  While artistic practices are not aimed at solving 
problems, in that this way of thinking acknowledges life itself as problematic by its very nature,  they 
may give rise to ways of living with them.  This way of thinking gives room for hope in the future, 
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